The book is called Security, Defence and the Future of Europe: Views from the Capitals. And it is my honor to introduce the moderator of this session, Paul Schmidt, the Secretary General of Austrian Society for European Politics. Paul Schmidt, please.
[Paul Schmidt] Thank you very much. This is actually the end of the first day of the Security Forum. It will continue, of course, tomorrow. Yes. Well, welcome to this very last panel of this very full and very, very interesting and impressive first day of the Moldova Security Forum.
I'm really impressed. This is also my first time here in Moldova. It's a shame. I have to come back. It is indeed a very good experience to be here, and I think the discussions up to today have been very interesting. I think they connect very well with what we're going to talk about right now.
And in order to tell you a little bit more about the book, I would like first of all to invite our panelists for this very sharp and to-the-point and concise almost 60 minutes. So you don't have to wait here for a long time, almost 60 minutes conversation here with many of the authors of our joint book. And I would like to invite Funda Tekin here to the panel. Funda is the director of the Institute for European Politics in Berlin, Germany. Welcome, Funda.
Then, I would like to invite Marion, Marion Mesma, to our panel here. Marion is the Program Director for International Security at Chatham House, London, United Kingdom. Then, I would like to invite Tony Lawrence. Tony, welcome. He's a research fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security in Estonia. And of course, someone I don't really have to present here, he's the host, Julian, Julian Groza, welcome. He is of course the Executive Director of the Institute for European Policies and Reforms, IPRE, who is one of the main organizers of this forum.
Now, welcome to our conversation on our book, Security, Defence and the Future of Europe: Views from the Capitals. It's a book which we are doing in the framework of TEPSA, which is the Trans-European Policy Studies Association. Now, welcome to all of you here in this wonderful palace, but also online. If you have any questions or comments, please send your questions and comments and I'll try to integrate them into the conversation.
Now, before we start, and before I ask you some questions and then we go to the audience, I would like to say a couple of words about this book actually. Now, this is actually the ninth book of the Views of the Capital series, which we do together with TEPSA. And this one is on security and defense. And it is, in fact, it has a lot to do with what we have been already talking about.
It has a lot to do with preparedness, readiness, public opinion, cross-border solidarity, sense of urgency, perception, public attitudes towards those challenges. And the book shows the very diversity of Europe. It is actually a collection of country chapters, around 200 pages. You don't have to read the whole book. It's a sort of a travel guide through the political Europe, so you can pick and choose. 42 chapters, 42 countries.
It's the 27 EU countries. It's the candidate and potential candidate countries, so the other 10, and then it's the neighboring countries, from Iceland, Norway to crossing Switzerland to to Turkey. Now, these are the country's chapters which we have in here. And so all the chapters are about four to five pages long. It's not a scientific, academic book. It is actually a book that, well, that can be used for teaching, in fact, of course, because it has a lot of study cases, but it is in particular for the interested public and for the experts and policy advisors who then can easily contact one of the authors and dive into the essence of the discussions in the different countries.
Now, so we have already talked about some of the differences, but of course, when you look through the chapters, you see that geography, history, play a major role, and size, of course, right? You have 23 out of the 27 EU countries that are NATO members. You have the neutral countries within the European Union and beyond. So in the EU it would be of course Ireland, Malta, Cyprus, and then Austria, that sometimes thinks of itself as an island too. And then of course outside, candidate country, Moldova plus Switzerland.
So you have different developments and all those elements actually have an impact on what the public think and how they actually view the challenges which we pose. Of course, the frontline countries and the countries that have had their history with with Russia have a completely different attitude than some of the other countries. The further you are away, the more more difficult it gets. Because in the panel before, we talked a lot about how to connect with people and how to convince people that this is something that we have to do and this is a necessity and there's an urgency.
Well, if you look at the chapters, country from country, there are many, many differences and many, many different approaches due to different cultural setups, due to different challenges. I mean, for Cyprus, for example, Turkey is much more urgent than than Ukraine, just to give you one of the examples, right? So the priorities that people set and see for themselves tend to be different and diverse.
Now, this translates into different perceptions of reality, which sometimes we don't really understand, right? I mean, I had, I remember a visit by a delegation of Finnish parliamentarians and they didn't really know what what why Austria was living on a different planet in terms of military challenges and the impact and effect and the help needed by by Ukraine. So this is very important to understand in order to answer the question which we all think is very important, but we don't really have an answer to, which is how to convince the people, our people, which are so different, that we need that support and we need to go down that road. Now, this is actually what you can find in the book, so no surprise here, I would recommend reading it, of course. It's actually published by Springer and there's a forward also by the European Commissioner for Security and Defense, Mr. Kubilius.
Okay. Now, what we have here on this panel is the perfect lineup for today because they're all authors of this book, of course. So I would like to just quickly bridge and connect their chapter and their article with the situation on the ground in their country. Now, I remember, Funda, when you were writing your comment, you gave it a very nice title, which is "Zeitenwende: not all that glitters is actually gold." Now, here's my question: where do we stand now regarding the Zeitenwende? I mean, we've heard from some of the German representatives and others, the external pressure and the internal domestic political pressure that the German government is actually, it's feeling the heat, right? So, where does this lead us and how strong can Germany be, being the most important and biggest European country with a particular important role in that situation?
[Funda Tekin] Yes, thank you. I think I chose that title, first of all, because I wanted to be it to be catchy, but of course also I wanted to highlight the ambiguity both within the country and the debate within the country, but then also with the expectations that other countries have towards Germany with regards to security and defense. And I think, and you already, you know, highlighted, you know, the structure of the book, and I think it's very, very good because you really have the different perspectives of the different countries in on the topic that you can then kind of interrelate. But maybe before I answer your question, I also would like to have two general remarks because I think we're really talking about a moving target and this at high speed. And of course, we wrote this, you know, those chapters, you know, back in 2025, and now we have a different situation and we have to be aware of that.
Another thing that also came to my mind while listening into today's discussions, I think our book really focused more on the hard security, defense and security aspects, while of course now we also talked today a lot about, you know, cognitive warfare, hybrid threats, cyber war, and also the Leipzig incident was mentioned a lot. And I think this of course also changes perceptions within the national debates. So I think with regards to the to the Zeitenwende and why it was a Zeitenwende in the first place, we of course have to also realize where, you know, Germany's approach to security and defense policy comes from and how it was historically embedded. And of course, this is inextricably linked to its World War II legacy. Ever since 1945, key pillars have been have been its strong commitment to multilateralism and a rule-based international order.
And then you also had the close embeddedness within European integration as a peace project and of course the transatlantic partnership. And then also Germany has focused on a comprehensive understanding of security. And here it's also important to to know that the Constitution defines the Bundeswehr, our army, as a defense army, allowing it to take action collectively with mandates of international organizations such as the UN, NATO, and the EU only. So I think this is really important to understand where when it comes to to the security approach. Another thing is also, and this was then basically also the Zeitenwende, is Germany's approach towards Russia.
And I think that was something, before 2022, it was more with regards to "Wandel durch Handel", so change through trade. And this was had already been prior to 2022 really contested. And the prime example for that is the entire debate around Nord Stream 2, where the German government was really saying, "This is an economic project, so we really need to do this," and then you had other countries who really saw it already as a security risk. And then, so having this in mind, of course, the Zeitenwende then was announced by Olaf Scholz, and that really related to, first of all, the energy security issue, and then of course also defense spending. So the commitment to 2% goal of NATO and also setting up a special fund worth of 100 billion for for the modernization of the Bundeswehr.
And why I said it did it doesn't really glitter is also because we have another special fund then set up by the following government, but we also need to be aware of the fact that this does not necessarily directly translate into European security, but also into German security. So I think this is something that with regards to, you know, where to buy from, more by German than than really abroad. So this is something that we need to to keep in mind. And why I think it's the ambiguity behind that is something what I really would like to point out is also that Germany is not giving justice in the effects in the things Germany actually does. So there is this very sticky narrative that is, you know, Germany delivering 5,000 helmets, you know, back in 2022.
And of course, Germany is doing so much more than that. And actually, I think it's the third biggest supporter of for Ukraine. So I think this really has been the Zeitenwende. And then with regards to support, also Merz now traveled to Ukraine just last weekend, and again had something in in its suitcase. It was again some financial support.
Germany does not deliver the Taurus missiles. And I think another thing is, and this relates to the previous panel, that in the German debate, it is really controversially debated whether Germany should militarily support Ukraine or not. And that was when I wrote the chapter a very highly intensified debate. And now this is kind of has ceased a bit, but you have time and again really the debates whether Germany should actually deliver or not or whether Germany should really try to negotiate with Russia. So this is basically the thing.
And then Merz is now, this is my final point, Merz has then announced that Germany, he is determined to develop Germany's army into the strongest conventional army of Europe with 260,000 persons plus 2,000 200,000 in reserve, the capacity building on drones and cyber and countering cyber attacks, and also the the brigades that have already mentioned with regards to Lithuania. So this is a very strong commitment, which should actually be perceived positively, but then you have a very ambiguous reactions from the EU member states because this then is basically the the France is rather irritated and suspicious, Poland feels a concurrence, competition with with Germany, and the Baltic states really welcome those plans. So here again, I think, you know, Germany needs to be aware or pay great attention if it kind of strengthens its defense spending and its defense capacities, it needs to have a European approach.
[Paul Schmidt] And also following up on what was discussed in the previous panel on how to convince the public and looking at the most recent election results in Germany from Sachsen-Anhalt to Berlin, how long can a government that loses those elections, even if they are regional elections, can maintain this this build-up?
[Funda Tekin] Well, I think actually Merz's visit to Ukraine is was kind of an attempt to remind everybody that Ukraine is still important, and that really took place right after after the elections. Of course, he was then again criticized by Alice Weidel from the AfD of having left on on the evening of the 3rd of October, which is the national reunification holiday. But I was also thinking when when it was mentioned in the previous panels, I don't think that the election results, particularly not in in Berlin, really resulted from the Ukraine questions. There are other aspects that were more important. Maybe with Sachsen-Anhalt, there, of course, the AfD and its approach to to Russia might have been a case in point, but in Berlin, it's really more the just like Anastasia said, it's more the housing issue and everything.
But of course, it's a destabilization effect, and I think Merz really needs now to kind of try to present gains in terms of domestic politics. He has been already called the so-called foreign policy Chancellor so far, and I'm not sure whether this is something or the right strategy in the future to also kind of stabilize the domestic political situation.
[Paul Schmidt] Now, on the other hand, when it comes to and I'd like to pass the microphone now to Marion, when when it comes to budgetary constraints and fiscal consolidation on the one hand, and on the other hand, building up or rearming in order to defend the country, this is also something which we have touched upon in the previous panel. This is of course a difficult choice, and then the question is, how do you, how do you translate that, how do you explain it and how do you convince the people that this is the way to go? In fact, there was one issue that was discussed on which I'd like to briefly point out on how to convince the people, and then one of the answers was, "Well, an attack would do the trick," right? But on the other hand, I mean, this would not be smart at all. The smartest thing would be to drain the country's in terms of of money and then have the nationalists taking over the governments, right? Much more effective and and and this is where the where this whole discussion on also housing, cost of living comes in, high energy costs, right? I mean, it's an easy trap for for populists. But Marion, that's not something that I actually wanted to ask you. What I wanted, my first question would be, because your comment is very much on the transatlantic relations versus the orientation towards Europe, right?
The special relations with the US is gone, right? I mean, there's a new Prime Minister in the UK, there has clearly been many, many not only rhetorical conflicts between the US and the UK. There seems to be a stronger orientation now towards towards European security and even European integration. Where do we stand right now? Is this just a point in time, just a moment, or is this, do you see a pattern here in a development that is to stay and that will get stronger?
[Marion Mesma] Yeah, this is of course a huge challenge for the UK because it has put so much of its security relations in the special relationship with the US over many decades. That's not a recent thing, that's not a peace dividend thing, that's something that essentially has been in place ever since the end of World War II. So for the UK, the especially the second Trump administration came as a real shock, perhaps not necessarily the election result, but the the different tone that the administration has been taking towards Europe and that we've also discussed throughout this conference so far. The Keir Starmer government essentially tried to play a bridge-building role between the UK, Europe, and the US. And I think to an extent it has managed that fairly well.
There was, I think the most fallout essentially took place over the US attacks on Iran and whether the UK was going to participate in that and support the US or not. But many aspects of the US-UK security relationship are essentially cemented in bilateral arrangements, in contracts that are still active. And some of those, such as for example the one that governs the nuclear relationship between the US and the UK, were actually strengthened towards the end of the Biden administration, which I think is really interesting because it was, it seemed like trying to build in an insurance policy for what was to come. So, I think what has really changed for the UK is understanding that European partners are much more important for UK security going forward, in huge part because I think we have just all been reminded that your geography determines your threat perception to such a huge degree. So the US maybe has the luxury of saying that they do not want to care all that much about European security and what's happening in Ukraine, but no one else in Europe can really say that because for all of us, it's on our continent, it's in our neighborhood, it affects all of us.
And so the UK, while I don't think the UK government would ever want to say that they are changing their relationship with the US because there are still some significant dependencies for the UK as one single state but also for NATO as a whole, they have quietly been trying to strengthen and build on other bilateral relationships. Some of them they've already had, some of them are newer. It's really interesting, for example, to look at all the various new agreements and cooperation treaties and so on that they have made with Ukraine as a government and then with various Ukrainian companies. And you can see this for almost any bilateral European relationship that the UK has. And the other thing, of course, is that ever since Brexit, NATO has been hugely important for the UK.
It always has been important, but the UK has essentially shifted a lot of its diplomatic attention to NATO as the main sort of European focused institution that it has been investing its diplomacy in. And it has tried to come up with various multilateral additions that could strengthen European security, such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, and various similar initiatives. You know, the coalition of the willing also comes to mind, this group of European states that wanted to ensure that support for Ukraine continues regardless of what the US wants to do. So, I think we're not going to hear any big statements from the UK that they want to distance themselves from the US. They will want to try to maintain that bridge as much as they can, but at the same time, if you look at the actions of the Keir Starmer government and that are now being carried on by the Andy Burnham government, there is a huge focus on strengthening bilateral security relationships with various European states and partners.
[Paul Schmidt] Now, two quick follow-up questions that would be personally very interesting for me. One is, do you think with the new Prime Minister and his new rhetoric taken, taking the possible future relationship with the European Union even one step further? Do you think is there a chance to get much closer to each other in terms of security, but beyond security, also in the field of economic relations, education, research? Do you think that that this would this is a real option where the British public would also go along? That would be my first question. And the second question is regarding this diversification of security and trade relations. I mean, if you look at the European Union now with this beautiful expression of associated membership with Canada, with trade agreements also with India, also Australia. I mean, we're we're seeing a sort of a European Commonwealth on the horizon. Do you think that this is a problem for for the UK somehow?
[Marion Mesma] I don't think that is a problem for the UK. The the conversations around the potential association between Canada and the EU were followed with a lot of interest in the UK because, you know, I think especially the current government, but also many others that were disappointed by Brexit, are thinking about how the UK-EU relationship can be rethought. So, if you look at public opinion polling, Brexit is increasingly unpopular the longer, the more time passes between the Brexit vote and now. That's in part because of demographic changes, it's in part because some some people who are now of voting age were not of voting age when the Brexit vote took place. I mean, it was now a decade ago, right? So, a lot of people essentially can vote now and are part of the British voting age population that weren't in 2016.
And and the other really interesting trend is that the some of the economic fallout of leaving the European Union is now increasingly apparent in the UK. And so even people that originally supported Brexit or voted for Brexit have now changed their minds. And this, I mean, of course, things can change, but if this trend was to continue, then Brexit essentially becomes more and more unpopular the more time passes, which makes it, I think, more likely that a future British government might want to try to significantly change its relationship with the EU. I think the biggest challenge that the current government has with regards to that is that the Labour Party manifesto didn't say anything about changing Brexit, you know, changing the status quo. So they can, they can tinker on the edges, they can, they can negotiate on some of the individual elements, whether that's joining the safe program, whether that's, you know, restarting some sort of mobility for youth, rejoining Erasmus, all of these great European programs.
But but there's not much more they can fundamentally do. So I think for future governments and for future election campaigns, this might again be more of a feature. And what I personally will find more interesting is not whether Labour would champion this because most Labour MPs were Remainer anyway and Labour as a party strongly supported staying in the European Union, but whether the Conservative Party is ever at a point where they actually change their mind on the European Union in huge part because the British public will change how it feels about the European Union and future British membership.
[Paul Schmidt] I see. Thank you. Tony, over to you. You're from Estonia, a small country, frontline country. How do you view the state of preparedness and readiness and the discussions which you read about and and hear about in other EU countries that are further away regarding security and defense?
[Tony Lawrence] Okay, thanks, Paul. I'll certainly come to that, but let me give some background first about Estonia. As you say, frontline state. The start point for any discussion about defense is the threat perception, and the threat perception in Estonia is has a very, very strong consensus about Russia being a long-term and existential threat. That's always been the case. It's certainly been amplified by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but also by the kind of sub-threshold actions that we've seen increasingly in the region. So sabotage, undersea cables, air incursions, stray drones.
There's also then an equally strong consensus that defense is extremely important to dealing with this threat. Many Estonians participate in defense, either as conscripts and then later reserves, or in the volunteer defense organizations. NATO membership is very popular, the presence of NATO troops in Estonia is also very popular. We have heard, I think in the last few months, some fairly, I would say, alarmist statements about the possibility of a Russian attack on on Europe and often naming Estonia or the other Baltic states as a kind of a prime target for this. Despite that, the official threat perception from Estonia is that this is a a low risk at the moment, at least while Russia is engaged in committed in Ukraine. But there is an expectation that should that situation finish, Russia will very quickly reconstitute and what's more become a threat to Europe for which we have to be ready.
So Estonia has always kind of taken two approaches to dealing with this threat. The first is to build up an independent self-defense capability, and the second is to seek to integrate with Western security structures, so NATO and the EU. And in recent years, and and this is I think sort of changed quite quickly, I think since since we wrote the book last year, it's adopted a very ambitious and expensive program of defense development. And a lot of that program is aimed towards implementing a new military strategy which is known as active defense. So active defense is about making sure that Russia doesn't even step over the border into Estonia at any point.
And it's based upon fortifications, border fortifications. So this is the Baltic defense line that Estonia is is building alongside Latvia and and Lithuania. But it's also, and I think this is a kind of more um maybe controversial, more innovative approach, it's based on buying longer range weapons and being able to strike Russian forces on their own territory before they even get to the to the border. This is all very expensive. Um Estonia is going to spend or is planning to spend at least 5% of GDP in the coming four years. That's the the planning horizon for for the state budget.
And that will make it one of NATO's biggest defense spenders. And this is core defense spending, so to to reflect back to the discussion we had in the panel before, this is obviously some way above the 3.5% that that is NATO's target for core defense. Also as part of this shift, Estonia, which has traditionally been pretty skeptical of a of an EU role in defense, has become something of a convert, not in an operational sense, but in the EU's role as a capability builder and and funder. So that's certainly a development of the last sort of two or three years. As far as the operational defense role goes in in international organizations, then the only show in town for Estonia is is NATO.
And through NATO, Estonia also wants to secure the commitment of the United States to European security, which it considers to be absolutely essential. That idea, of course, has been challenged by the second Trump administration. The US has been very open in saying that it's no longer going to be such a strong supporter of of European defense arrangements. And the kind of rhetoric that we've heard from the administration really has sown doubt in in European minds about even whether that limited level of support is going to be available at all. I'll just finish with a slightly broader point.
So I I would argue that that Europe is converging on a policy response to these developments, and that policy response is the Europeanization of of NATO. That's not necessarily the same thing as the NATO 3.0 that America is talking about, but it certainly means that Europe has accepted the need to make a much stronger contribution to to NATO's shared burden. And they do so both in the hope that this will be enough to persuade America to stay on board, because we still want to work with the Americans whenever that's possible, but also to ensure that Europe, if if the Americans are not with us, has the best possible arrangements for for our own defense. Even a a NATO that's stripped of the US would still be a much more credible alternative than say the European Union or a coalition of the willing or or whatever else is out there. European leaders aren't really talking about this in public. I mean, there's still a wish not to be saying something that that maybe misinterpreted as some kind of um you know, critical of of the US.
But I think this is the way that things are are moving, and and this includes traditionally very transatlantic states like Estonia. So this is kind of sad for for somebody like myself who's who's been in this business and dealt with transatlantic relations for a long time, but I'm actually quite optimistic that that Europe is really seized of this initiative. And I think, you know, we have a sticky few years ahead of us because we don't have all the capability we need, but I think we're going to come out of it stronger in the end.
[Paul Schmidt] Okay, Tony. Again, the question, how from from from a country where the the public is very much aware of what is happening and and the threat potential, the threat perception, the preparedness, how do you view the discussions in the other, in some of the other European countries that are further away that are much more ambivalent or much less focused on on this threat? What what role can actually also the Estonians in Estonia play to to motivate those discussions and and and convince people that that they they have to look carefully on what's going on and it could actually um it could actually be them too as as as victims of hybrid attacks or different sorts of attacks. How do you how do you perceive that? I I would be interested in knowing.
[Tony Lawrence] Sure. I mean, I think it's it's actually there or at least getting there at least amongst European leaderships, not necessarily amongst all populations. But I mean, I guess sort of behind your question is the idea that NATO might abandon the Baltic states, let's say, if they're attacked. And I I find that a very difficult scenario to to to believe, not because people are necessarily invested in the Baltic states themselves, but because they're invested in NATO. And for 75 years, European nations have said that the foundation of their security is the alliance. And they're not going to throw that away.
The other aspect is I think, even if, as you said in your introduction, you know, the further to the south and the west you go, the harder it is for people to appreciate the threat and be ready to respond to it, I still think there's a strong enough core group inside the alliance, you know, the Nordic Baltic states, Germany, France, Poland, the Netherlands, and this will, you know, motivate the rest of the alliance to become involved if this kind of crisis occurs. So yeah, I I I don't really think there'll be much hesitation come the day.
[Paul Schmidt] Okay. It's good that we need we need your optimism, I think. Julian, over to you. You're one of the co-authors of of your chapter on Moldova, and I would like, maybe also ask you to react with some of the things to some of the things that you have heard because it seems to be, if I sum up the the whole day of very interesting discussions, it seems to be that there's a lot of agreement on many of the things, the challenges, the needs, the tasks ahead. But then there's this people out there that everyone says we have to talk to and we have to convince them and they're so different, it will be so difficult for them to understand and to support us.
And I'm wondering, also from your point of view here from from Moldova, how do you, I mean, you have a lot of contacts with your colleagues in other countries, you travel a lot, how do you perceive, because Istvan said, "We have to tell the truth." Do you think that all the time the other EU capitals are telling you the truth regarding Moldova? Is there enough support or do you feel that this can be fragile, volatile? We have to maintain, engage in a conversation and and and be more open and frank with each other. How do you how do you perceive this?
[Julian Groza] No, definitely. I think partnership means being a credible partner, a trustful partner. And Moldova being here in this region has been always affected by challenges where partnership was challenged with our partners. And I think what we see today, I think it's not about telling the truth or telling half the truth, it's about reaching out. Moldova has been much more known to Europe and to the world when we had to respond to pressure, when we had to face crises, challenges.
And Moldova today is the most affected country after Ukraine due to the war of aggression of Russia in Ukraine. And Moldova is a target of the hybrid war of Russia, and we have been a test ground of hybrid war operations. And I think the partnership translated into very concrete actions that Moldova has seen over the last three, four years. We have not been alone in our response. We had to expedite a lot of unreformed processes that have been left aside or behind for over 30 years of our independence.
We are a young democracy with long strains into the Soviet occupation, like just Baltic countries have been, but Baltic countries have been more determined and and had been more clear into their way towards the West, towards the Western democracies. We have been for some time in the middle of empires or spheres of influence. And for many years, we have been a gray zone. And that approach had weakened us. And it's only after we had to face the war at the border or the aggressive malign influence from Russia, which has been here in Moldova for many years in many ways, with proxies, controlled or, I mean, politicians, business dependencies.
So in a matter of three, four years, we had to start to cut those strains, start to change institutions, start to address differences, and start to build resilience through a more transparent, more engaged institutions, more accountable institutions, and more open institutions to the public. And in this effort, we have been supported. And I think that is the translation of how a trustful partnership is built. And I think this is how Moldova is known today. Moldova, a small country under pressure, but managing to resist asymmetric aggression with limited resources, having weak institutions for some time, and so on and so forth.
So we had to clarify that, and I think one of the moments when we managed to clarify the threats we face, where we are, where we're heading, in terms of security and defense, was the moment when in 2023, Moldova had a new modern National Security Strategy that changed a lot because the security discussion in this country was always a taboo topic. Politicians were also always speculated about it. There was a perception that neutrality defends us, but we know that neutrality does not defend you or stop the drones or rockets or stop cyber attacks or hybrid aggression or influence. No, it does not protect you. So we have to review that concept.
Neutrality has to be protected, and I think that is very important, but that does mean we have not, we do not have to invest in defense. And just imagine, four years ago, Moldovan defense budget was 45 million euros. 45 million euros. 70 to 75% of that budget was personal costs. We had an unreformed army, we had outdated equipment. And for 30 years, politicians in this country have not invested in defense saying that we are neutral, so nobody will attack.
And whenever discussion about defense spending came, like we heard today, even on the occasion of this forum, we have seen politicians connected to Kremlin saying that they organize the security forum affecting our neutrality, militarizing the country, basically copying the narratives of Russia. And our response to that is no. Neutrality, a country like Moldova, a neutral country like Moldova, where we are now, needs more clarity, more partnership, and more investment in defense. And this is why Moldova, being neutral, is part of the coalition of the willing, and we are there to support Ukraine, to be solidary with Ukraine with what we can. And I think the first days of the war, our own contribution was to mobilize ourselves and open our doors to Ukrainian fellows that were running from the war. And this is how we have been known to the world, a small country with a big heart. That was the narrative for the first year of the war.
But then, it was not only about that, it's about the story of Moldova, how we under pressure managed to resist Russia, and now how we managed to do that in partnership with our allies in Europe. And now is the time when Moldova can be part of the effort of defense. And I'm great that we have seen now this week, we have seen the policy review of the EU. Today, we expected the new European Security Strategy. Not sure it's published yet, it has been delayed. But already in this policy review, we see that EU attaches a lot of attention in terms of the enlargement policy, the aspect of security. So it's about geopolitical effort that EU has to has to demonstrate, and EU is aware now that enlargement is also security because a Moldova, Moldova or Ukraine is more secure within the European Union, and the European Union is much more secure with our countries within because the costs of not being in the EU are much higher.
And I think the costs of hesitation for years of not accepting the real fact that our countries have to be part of the European family, not to provoke, not to provoke Russia, have not worked. And now we all have to pay the price. And I think the answer to the partnership and also the answer to what we should do next and to communicate to our people is to show leadership. Is to show leadership, is to communicate, to be transparent, to be frank. Leadership as a country, leadership as as as, you know, as community leaders. And I think that is, that may help to maintain, to increase the will in action, because over these days, we discussed a lot about what can be done to address Russia's escalation. And I think we have everything, but now we're lacking enough will and cooperation and engagement to do the right things now. So I think I hope that by this type of events, by this type of efforts of the think tank community, including with this book, projecting very clearly the options and the ways to go, I think we can contribute to a more informed security debate, not only in our countries, but also in Europe as a whole. Thank you.
[Paul Schmidt] Julian, we have everything but time. So for the last nine minutes, I would like to give the floor to the audience and see if someone would like to comment something or ask a question. Or are you all very, very tired from this full day? So, okay, I can use the last eight and something minutes to ask a question myself. Julian, a very quick, quick answer, please. Anastasia, your colleague, she talked about the fact that not everyone in the European Union sees the geopolitical momentum. But you just said that enlargement is very much about security, but in many of our countries, people would not understand that. So if you would be somewhere on the Austrian mountains and someone would ask you, "Why should I be in favor of enlargement?" In one sentence, what would you tell that person?
[Julian Groza] First of all, come to Moldova, come to Ukraine, see for yourself what hesitation means, what lack of solidarity means, what lack of will and engagement means. Come back to your country and talk to your people, and I'm sure you'll convince them how it's important to be part of a big family because you are stronger together. And nations that share the same value have to be together because this is the only way we can protect and defend ourselves.
[Paul Schmidt] Okay, I will remember that line. I will tell them that when I see them, and then I will get back to you and maybe we see each other back here in Chișinău. Marion, what is the public debate in in in the UK? What would be convincing arguments? I mean, I know that there's public support also for having the UK strongly supporting Ukraine and and neighboring countries, but still, how sustainable is this and what what are the real arguments that that that happen in that public discussion?
[Marion Mesma] Well, the challenge in the UK is that because the UK economy has been struggling for a while, a lot of the public debate is actually about the cost of living crisis, the fact that salaries haven't increased in a good number of years and so on. So even though the population, when asked directly whether they support Ukraine, whether they support NATO and defense spending, do actually support all of these things, I think if you were to ask an everyday person on the street how that would rank in comparison to other priorities, it probably wouldn't rank quite as highly. So one of the things that really strikes me about the debate in the UK in comparison, for example, to Estonia or to many other countries, is that the UK government is not yet very transparent about all the grey-zone attacks that the UK is constantly under, like any European country. So I would really like to see there to be much more of a focus on making clear what kind of cyber attacks take place, when you can attribute sabotage clearly, and those kind of steps, because I think just showing that would show the public what kind of a threat they are under every single day.
[Paul Schmidt] Funda, has has Leipzig been a game-changer in terms of public opinion? Leipzig, the failed attack in Leipzig. Do you think that this is a game-changer or what, what do you think, how would you use geopolitics in in a discussion in a restaurant or on the street? I mean, people don't relate to that, do they?
[Funda Tekin] I think that in Germany, already the threat perception is not that low, not comparably to to Spain or Southern European countries. And I mean, I haven't looked at the figures in in polls after after Leipzig, but from my understanding also in terms of media coverage, that was the first time that Russia was really called out, you know, identified as the aggressor. And of course, that is then also debated, and I think that and we have, you know, different attacks on our electricity grid and this people really feel that, you know, we need to build up resilience. But whether this really has then the geopolitical dimension, I would need to look into the figures. But I wanted to just answer one sentence with regards to the enlargement question because I do understand Julian's answer, but this was also my my question in the enlargement session.
I think we need, in order to convince all people, we need a broader narrative than only geopolitics and security, because I don't think that this is going to win over the entire population or member states because threat perceptions are too different with regards to that. And I really liked, you know, the the Dutch perspective on on the previous panel, but I think we need to have the security narrative, we need to have also the the welfare narrative, the being stronger together. So this is really something, also the the single market narrative, so really kind of putting everything together and in order to get everybody on board.
[Paul Schmidt] Tony, from your perception, regarding enlargement also, maybe, can you think of other arguments which are not related to security to convince the EU 27 public that this is the way to go and this is a priority and this is something that needs to be done?
[Tony Lawrence] This is not particularly my my area, but I do think security is is the big one. And and the EU says it itself. I mean, it's like the first thing that that's there on on the web page when you open it, you know, our security begins at our peripheries. So, and and if the war in Ukraine has not shown, you know, the the truth of that kind of statement, then, you know, maybe other arguments just kind of pale into insignificance.
[Paul Schmidt] In one year time, where do you think the European security architecture is is actually? And how do you see the compatibility between what the EU is doing in terms of procurement and investment? How do you see it aligned with with the NATO efforts here?
[Tony Lawrence] So I think there's a, again, an emerging division of responsibility between these organizations, that the EU is going to be the organization that procures and supports military capability development, and that NATO is the organization that does collective defense. In between that, there are crisis management type situations, and probably there's a role, a division of role between the two organizations for that. But I mean, as I said, I'm I'm positive about this. I do think we're on the right track. I think Europe will look stronger.
That may cause tensions with the United States because I think as we get stronger and more confident, we will want to have a larger role in decision shaping inside the transatlantic alliance. And I don't think that's what the Americans currently think with their their idea of NATO 3.0. They still want to continue to call the shots. But I think this is just inevitable that this is the way that things are going to go. I don't believe that this current American attitude is just a short-term blip. I think there are long-term perspectives, long-term trends behind this that will just continue over time and and America is not going to come back with a new administration that will suddenly be very transatlanticist again. So, you know, it's up to us to to bite this bullet and take things forward in in a way that that helps us.
[Paul Schmidt] Well, I think that's that's a very good sentence to conclude the panel. In fact, it is up to us and we have to decide ourselves. And maybe we are much better and stronger than we sometimes think we are. And we have seen here four, even four and a half, almost five different perspectives and views on what's going on. And if you'd have a look at the book, you even have 42 different perspectives. So it's not getting, it's not getting easier. It's a complex issue, but maybe that's also the attractiveness of of Europe and and European integration.
Having said this, I would like to thank very much Funda, Marion, Tony, and Julian for being here with me and for discussing your chapters and going beyond the chapters. And a particular very, very, I'm very grateful to the organizers for giving us the chance to present the book here. Thank you for bearing with us and have a very nice evening in Chișinău and keep in touch. Thank you.
[Julian Groza] Thank you very much, Paul, for for closing this session, but also once again, just to hand the mic to Sanda so that she finishes the day and announce for tomorrow because I will take the mic from her tomorrow morning. Thank you.
[Sanda] Thank you very much, Julian. Indeed, today in the evening, we are doing this passing from from me to Julian, who will moderate the sessions tomorrow. But I just wanted to say thank you very much for being with us. Thank you very much to our speakers, to our panelists, to our great and wonderful moderators. As we conclude the first day of Moldova Security Forum, I would like to get back to one of the first questions that we asked when we started this forum today, and this is how do we turn our shared understanding of the threats into the capacity to protect our people?
And I think today gave us several very important discussions and directions. First of all, we understood that Moldova's contribution to European security is really tangible. In the presentation of Madam President, we understood very well how Moldova contributes to the security of European continent. Second, our discussion is placing Moldova's security into the wider Black Sea region, but also it shows that we have to strengthen and to leverage the partnerships that we have with the European Union, with NATO, and with individual countries. Another important point, it's credible security requires sustained investments. So we had a separate panel where we discussed about that, the necessity to increase the defense budgets in order to be able to protect our nations and to protect the security.
And besides that, there was a very good session today. Unfortunately, it was a closed one, but we also addressed the topic of peaceful reintegration of Moldova. How do we keep the interest of our people on both banks of Nistru and within a wider conversation about Moldova's future? And across all these subjects, one lesson it really deserves a particular attention, and we are getting back to the topic of the Moldova Security Forum during this year, and this is democratic resilience. Because democracies, they do need trust, and they do need the to strengthen the relationship between the citizens and between state institutions in order to make sure that citizens believe in their voices, making sure that their voices matter, and making sure that their freedom are protected.
And all of this brings us directly to tomorrow, which is a very, will be a day packed with interesting sessions. First of all, we will resume tomorrow at 9:00 in the morning with an opening by the NATO Deputy Secretary General. So we are very honored to have Radmila Šekerinska with us opening the forum. But we will also have a video message from Andrius Kubilius, the European Commissioner for Defence and Space. Unfortunately, Andrius could not be here with us tomorrow, but he is sending his best regards and there is a video registration for us.
But before we close for for today, I would like to say thank you to all of you, but thank you to the co-organizers. Thank you to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Thank you to Julian and the wonderful team at IPRE. And thank you to our dearest colleagues from the NATO Liaison Office in the Republic of Moldova, but also a sincere thank you to our colleagues from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Moldova. They provided the institutional support and they are partners in organizing Moldova Security Forum this year.
And dear friends, I'm sure that the value of this forum will be measured in decisions, in partnerships, but also in work that will follow tomorrow, but also in the next couple of months after the forum, when we will get back, strengthen and leverage the partnerships and cooperations that we've established here today. Thank you very much. Looking forward to seeing you all tomorrow. Vă mulțumesc.
